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CORRESPONDENCE

Posner on Literature
L.H. LaRue*

Judge Richard A. Posner has expanded the scope of his writing.
We have previously known him as one of the leaders in law and economics. He is now moving into the field of law and literature. His
offering is an article, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, which
has been published in the Virginia Law Review. 1
As one might expect, he performs intelligently. Posner is well read
in literature; he displays a genuine love for that which he has read; and
he writes with wit and grace. In short, in law and literature, as in law
and economics, Posner is a force to be reckoned with. The evidence
for these assertions can be found in the article: his comments on W.B.
Yeats' poems Easter 1916 (pp. 1363-64, 1366) and The Second Coming
(pp. 1378-79) demonstrate his skill as a reader of poetry; his literary
analysis of Justice Holmes' dissent in the Lochner case (pp. 1379-85,
1389-90) shows that he can apply these literary skills to a reading of
judicial opinions.
However, I must utter a "however." As I read Posner (and I
would recommend others read him) he builds his analysis on the base
of several dichotomies that seem to be drawn from ordinary common
sense. One of the dichotomies is the distinction of pleasure versus instruction. Another is form (or style) versus content. Yet another is
science versus rhetoric. These several dichotomies are linked into a
logic that provides the structural underpinning for Posner's analysis;
my caveat is that the logic of these dichotomies limits rather than
strengthens his analysis. This is my conclusion, so let me now start at
the beginning.
Posner starts unobjectionably enough by noting that literature is
that which we treat as literature; the poet may offer something as a
poem, but we must accept (p. 1355). This is a satisfactory starting
point. The next step is to ask: why might we accept? Posner's answer
here is conventional, but none the worse for being so; we accept a
work as literature because it deals with great themes that have mean• Professor of Law and Director, Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University School of Law. - Ed.
1. 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986).
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ing across generations of humankind. One of the great themes is law,
which is at the core of many works of literature (pp. 1354-56).
As a starting point, none of this is objectionable, although most of
us who have labored in this particular vineyard would find it incomplete. The mystery of literature's survivability is complex, for it is not
altogether clear what "survive" means in this context. To say that a
poem or a novel survives by being read says nearly nothing, for the
word "read" is a word of enormous ambiguity and equivocation. The
problem here is that Posner rests with the common-sense meanings of
"survive" and "read," whereas I think that there is some difficult conceptual and theoretical analysis that must be done. Posner would perhaps not disagree with this; I suspect that in his forthcoming work (we
can surely expect more) Posner will address these questions. In his
work in law and economics, he has proved himself to be adept at theory, and so we can expect him to address these theoretical questions at
some future date. However, in this particular article, Posner does not
wish to address the theoretics of reading; he has more immediate questions, to which I would now tum.
Let us take as granted the fact that the problems of law and justice
are profound themes in some of the treasures of our literature. One
can then ask two questions: Do lawyers have anything special to say
about this literature? Does this literature have anything special to say
to lawyers? Judge Posner's answer is skeptical on both counts, and
since the skeptic can always be rewarded by having good grounds for
his skepticism, it follows that much of what Posner says will be true.
Even so, I differ; let me explain.
Take the first question: do lawyers have anything special to say
about literature that deals with law? Posner is surely right in being
skeptical about any affirmative answer to this question. Unless the
well-trained lawyer is equally well educated in literature, his or her
comments about The Merchant of Venice or The Trial are likely to be
shallow or otiose. However, Posner does cite lawyer-critics such as
Richard Weisberg and James Boyd White (p. 1358 n.29), and he cites
them approvingly. I would go further and cite them enthusiastically;
the combination of literary training and legal training combines fruitfully in them, so that I am tempted to cite the old maxim about the
whole being greater than the sum of its parts: their literary criticism is
enriched by their reflections on law. Although I am confident about
this judgment, I do not wish to argue it; one Cllil read White and Weisberg and decide for oneself; and at any rate, Posner's second question
is the important one.
Posner's second question is: does literature have anything to teach

November 1986]

Correspondence

327

lawyers? Here too, it is reasonable to be skeptical; it is fair to put the
burden of proof on the proponent. Consider Posner's remarks on statutes (pp. 1360-75). Posner separates the world of statutes and the
world of poems by way of the dichotomy of instruction versus pleasure. Statutes are written to instruct us about what we ought to do,
but poems do not have this sort of directive function. We read poems
for pleasure. Consequently, one can argue that the art of interpreting
poems is irrelevant to the task of interpreting statutes. On the surface
of the matter, this seems to be simple common sense. However, common-sense dichotomies are always suspicious.
As an analogy, consider "play." Children play at games and at
make-believe, singly and in groups, with great pleasure and true intensity. And the reason that they play is because of the pleasure. But to
suggest that they are not thereby instructed in some of the most important things that they need to know is to suggest something that is
surely false. Indeed, it appears that the inscrutable ways of divine
providence have decreed that we are instructed in the most important
things in the most indirect of ways. I think something like this must
be true of literature. Narrative, myth, poetry, and song appear to be
among the most ancient products of language. The systematic treatise
comes late, and I think it would be foolhardy to suggest that instruction from science somehow has priority over fairy tales.
My own analysis of statutes would be to suggest that every statute
does more than simply instruct; it also creates a "fictive world."
Everyone who writes a statute makes a claim, albeit an implicit claim,
that the statutory words are adequate to address a particular set of
problems. This implicit claim is sure to be false and :fictitious. Literature has much to teach about the way in which statutory language is
:fictitious, since poets themselves have spoken profoundly on the problem of speaking. To be sure, this literary knowledge may not help
lawyers and judges decide cases, but it does reveal things which are of
practical importance to them, such as: Why do most people think
legal talk is alien? Why is the word "legalistic" a pejorative? The
"fictive world" of statutory language is bizarre, and literature can
teach lawyers why this is so.
With respect to judicial opinions, Posner grants that there is something that literature can teach. His point of concession rests on the
proposition that a judicial opinion is drafted to persuade as well as to
instruct, and further, to persuade in circumstances where we do not
have scientific knowledge. Without science, we cannot persuade by
fact and logic alone. The something more is found in rhetoric, in
which one uses the devices of style to persuade. Lacking science, we
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do not suspend judgment, for judgment is necessary. Lacking science,
we are open to persuasion in many ways (pp. 1375-79). This analysis
links two dichotomies; the science-versus-rhetoric dichotomy is linked
to the form-and-content dichotomy. In science, the form (or style) is
said by Posner to be irrelevant; the meaning of a scientific treatise depends solely upon its content. However, literature is more like rhetoric than it is like science; in literature and rhetoric, form is not
irrelevant. Meaning is determined by a combination of form and content, and persuasion is generated by the extraordinary power that this
combination of form and content can create.
By this view of the matter, literature has much to teach us. If we
wish to learn about style, we need to turn to the place where style is
most magnificently demonstrated, that is, to literature. And we can be
aided in our study of style by the guidance of literary critics, who have
made it their specialty (p. 1375). Having gained this knowledge, we
can carry it back to the province of the judicial opinion. There, we can
study what judges do, and with our increased sophistication in matters
of style, we can see better how they go about doing it, that is, how they
go about persuading us. Alternatively, we can improve our own style,
and thus be more able performers (pp. 1388-91).
I do not wish to say that these things are false. What Posner says
about judicial opinions is true enough at the level of common sense,
but I would prefer to strike out in another direction. I would say here
some things that are analogous to what I have said about statutes.
Here too, the most important implicit claim in any judicial opinion is
the claim that it makes sense to talk about the world in this way. The
deepest criticisms are those which call into question the terms of description and of value that the judge is employing. Literature has
much to teach here, especially about narrative. Most judicial opinions
contain a "story"; it is called "the statement of facts." Unfortunately,
it is usually a rather bad example of the narrative art. My point is not
merely that the judicial "short story" lacks grace, but that it lacks
imagination. Lawyers and judges need to ponder such questions as:
Why are litigants frustrated even when they win? Is it necessary for
opinions to leave out as much as they do? Do novelists tell stories that
are truer than those that judges tell? How is it that a statement of
facts, all of which are true facts, can still be false as a story?
I freely admit that my commentary on Posner is vulnerable; what I
have said is an example of the genre - I am more interested in talking
about what he didn't write than about what he actually wrote - and
the genre is suspect. Perhaps I have uttered irrelevancies; perhaps I
have raised questions for further inquiry; the reader must judge.

